In my previous post I have argued that a new status quo has emerged in
Central Asia over the past few years. During this period Russia and China have worked
out and tailored their respective strategies of pursuing their interests in the
region: selective multilateralism and bilateralism. Moscow has strived to
secure its grip on Central Asia by means of integrating Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan into the Eurasian Union and by maintaining a military presence
under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Beijing has
focused on the establishment of bilateral economic ties. A series of agreements
have been concluded with Central Asian states since the late-2000s involving
multi-billion dollar loans and investments, in particular in energy exploration
and infrastructure. As a result, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which was supposed to be the most suitable structure for region-wide
cooperation, has found itself side-tracked. The summit of the SCO, which took
place in Bishkek in mid-September, has only testified to the continuing stagnation.
The fundamental bone of contention concerns what type of organization the
SCO should be: a vehicle that facilitates the pursuit of the global interests of
great powers (i.e. of Russia and China), or the framework for cooperation in
Central Asia which would not be dominated by any single actor.
The Bishkek declaration conforms to the former vision, promoted first and foremost by the
Kremlin. With the focus on global challenges and strategic issues, this
document resembles those issued regularly at the Russo-Chinese bilateral summits
and reflects concerns which predominate in Moscow and Beijing. In the
declaration the SCO members have: criticized the West’s propensity to use force
and its disrespect for international law; called for UN principles to be
respected and for the organization to be reformed; expressed concerns related
to climate change and food security. They have taken a stance with regard to
almost all on-going international crises and contentious issues: they have supported
Russia’s initiative concerning Syria’s chemical weapons, opposed the threats of
the use of force against Iran and deemed the development of regional or global
missile defence unacceptable.
Regional affairs are barely
mentioned in the Bishkek declaration. The dispute on how the SCO should finance
joint projects – by creating a development fund (promoted by Russia) or a
development bank (promoted by China) – has not been solved and the mutually
exclusive ideas have found their way into the final document. Russia is not
interested in establishing yet another international bank in the post-Soviet
space as it is already financing the Eurasian Development Bank. China, on its
part, is seeking a flexible formula which could facilitate the implementation
of its region-wide energy- and infrastructure-related projects.
This disagreement
goes beyond rhetoric or purely economic calculations and reveals a fundamental
difference between Moscow and Beijing that prevents greater cooperation among the
SCO members. Russia would prefer an organization with global reach and
objectives. This is because Moscow already has an abundance of organizations at
its disposal in the post-Soviet space, including the Eurasian Union, EurAsEC
and CSTO. Conversely, China is in need of a regional organization which would help
neutralize the fears of smaller Central Asian states and smooth China’s
economic expansion, providing multilateral clout. One of the outstanding
consequences of the Russo-Chinese difference is the persistent absence of
agreement on the issue of the enlargement of the SCO. The temporary solution,
which may prove long-lasting, has been to introduce different association
categories, such as observers (e.g. India and Mongolia) and ‘partners in
dialogue’ (e.g. Belarus and Turkey).
The only issue which the
SCO leaders fully agree on seems to be the necessity to protect their regimes
from real and imagined enemies. The attention paid to the Arab revolutions as
well as the focus on information security illustrate deep-seated fears of
autocrats. The ‘authoritarian security community’ may turn out to be the only
possible path for the development of the SCO. But, if that is the case, should
not Kyrgyzstan be replaced by Turkmenistan?