Observers of Russian-Chinese relations
continue to search for Moscow’s potential balancing acts against China’s rising
power. It seems unlikely that the Kremlin could have ‘put all its eggs into one
basket’, particularly taking into account the growing asymmetry of power
between the two states. Russia’s diplomatic offensive towards its Asian
neighbours last month has given the impression that Moscow is trying to escape
from its Sinocentric policies. The political-military consultations with Japan
were conducted for the first time in history in the ‘2+2’ formula (foreign
affairs and defence ministers). Vietnam was offered closer co-operation with
the Russian-led Customs Union. The idea of a transit corridor from East Asia to
Europe (of course via Russia) was aimed at attracting the attention of South
Korea. Russia finally handed over the aircraft carrier to India which New Delhi
ordered almost a decade ago.
Is Russia trying to hedge (if not balance)
against China’s rise? How seriously should these attempts be taken? What are
Moscow’s prospects for improving its position with regard to Beijing by means
of closer ties with China’s neighbours?
For decades, dating back to the Soviet
period, Moscow has considered India as the best counterweight to China. After a
short period of mutual post-Cold War disappointment, Russia and India re-built
their relations. The arms trade was the most acute symbol of India’s place in Russia’s
foreign policy landscape. Russia used to sell its most advanced weaponry to
India while denying similar equipment to China. This pattern persisted till the
early-2010s, when serious obstacles emerged. The American-Indian
quasi-alignment, dating back to 2005, has been viewed by Moscow with growing
suspicion. Russian arms producers started to lose one bid after another for the
Indian weapons market, including the tender for 126 multi-role combat aircraft,
worth US$ 20 billion. Russia’s reputation as arms supplier for the Indian armed
forces has also deteriorated. The delivery of the aircraft carrier was
postponed several times and its price doubled over a decade. Both states
continue to co-operate on the construction of the 5th generation fighter but implementation
has been terribly slow. Stripped of the arms trade, Russian-Indian relations
will become an empty shell. There are no joint economic projects or
investments. India’s access to Russia’s energy resources is limited. Moreover,
the expected Russian-Chinese agreement on the sale of the Su-35 fighters – a
more advanced type of aircraft than that operated by India – would mark the end
of India’s privileged position in the Russian worldview.
Interestingly, Moscow seems to have noticed
India’s weakness as a potential counter-balance against a rising China and has
reached out to the East Asian states – Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. All
three states, despite their entanglements with the Chinese economy, remain
suspicious towards Beijing’s intentions and wary of the growing might of China.
Another candidate to counter-balance
China, Japan, was approached by Russia only after the end of the Cold War.
Since then, Moscow has repeatedly attempted to mend fences with Tokyo, offering
access to East Siberian oil and gas and inviting Japanese investors to the
Russian Far East. Every time, the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands
has stood in the way of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement. The most recent
overture was made by Russia after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.
Moscow declared its readiness to replace the nuclear component of Japan’s
energy balance sheet with its hydrocarbons. While the Russian idea was not
implemented, the return of Shinzo Abe as prime minister in Japan paved the way
for closer political ties. In April 2013 he paid a visit to Russia, followed by
the ‘2+2’ consultations in November. Both states agreed to deepen security
co-operation, including the conduct of joint naval exercises. The key question
regards the extent to which this momentum can be sustained, particularly if it
is not supplemented with closer economic co-operation. This is even more the
case since rapprochement with Japan has not prevented further security
co-operation between Russia and China – further naval drills have been
announced for 2014. Chinese companies secured access to the lion’s share of the
Russian oil sent to the Asian market.
With regard to smaller Asian states, such
as Vietnam or both Koreas, Moscow has consistently pursued certain ideas for
the last decade. Vietnam has become an important customer of the Russian
military-industrial complex (e.g. the sale of submarines) and for Russian
energy companies (e.g. exploration of oil in the South China Sea by the joint
venture Vietsovpetro). Moscow has also been attempting to convince Vietnam to
allow Russia to return to the naval base in Cam Ranh, which it vacated in 2001.
The most recent idea encompasses the establishment of a free trade zone between
Vietnam and the Customs Union. In the case of the Korean states, Russia has
been promoting the idea of the Asia-Europe corridor, linking the two Koreas
with the Russian railway system. Its first stage – the link between Russia and
North Korea – was built in September 2013.
Looking at the broader East and South Asian
picture, it is difficult to assess to what extent the policies pursued by
Russia can contribute to making it less dependent on China. The ideas which
they are based on are not new – they have been part of Russia’s discourse for
several years. It is their implementation that has turned out to be much more
difficult to achieve.