The bolstering of
Russian-Chinese ties stands out as one of the key international consequences of
the Ukrainian crisis. Attempting to push back against Western sanctions, Russia
turned to the East and embraced China as a very close partner.
Over the course of the past few months, both sides finalised decade-long
negotiations leading to the signing of a 30-year gas deal.
They also concluded numerous agreements on economic co-operation, including one
envisioning Chinese companies constructing a high-speed railway linking the Russian
cities of Moscow and Kazan.
Russia’s turn to China did not, however, start with the Ukrainian crisis. Its
roots go even deeper than Putin’s third presidential term with its increasingly
anti-Western and conservative agenda. The focus on China is embedded in the
2008-2009 global economic crisis.
Ten years ago,
in the mid-2000s, such a turn to China seemed implausible. Russian-Chinese
relations were said to have run out of the post-Cold War steam they had been
running on. Despite important positive bilateral developments, such as the
signing of the border agreement, the creation of the Shanghai Co-operation
Organization (SCO) and the provision of military equipment necessary for the modernisation
of the Chinese armed forces, the Russian-Chinese rapprochement was facing a
growing number of obstacles. No energy partnership materialised. Russia was
at pains to avoid dependence on China in its plans for oil and gas exports to
Asia and was repeatedly reaching out to Japan, South Korea and other potential
customers. Moscow delayed decision on the construction of Asian pipelines,
attempting to stir up competition for its natural resources. The arms sales to China
stalled, with Russia unwilling to provide the most advanced weapons and unable
to come to terms with China’s illegal copying. As China’s influence in Central
Asia grew incrementally, the region was expected to turn into the field of
competition and rivalry in the immediate future. Globally, despite shared criticisms of
American international primacy, both states pursued different policies. Russia
challenged US predominance while China searched for a modus vivendi. Taken
together, these developments were, it seemed, not conducive to a more amicable
relationship between Moscow and Beijing. China moved up the international power
ladder and increased the distance separating it from Russia. The global
economic crisis of 2008-2009 only reinforced these trends: China’s rise
accelerated, while Russia’s resurgence hit the doldrums.
Surprisingly,
Russia and China did not drift apart. On the contrary, Moscow turned towards
Beijing. Following the economic crisis, energy co-operation recommenced. Russia
constructed the first oil pipeline to China, and this was followed by the signing
of a series of contracts on oil deliveries. These made Chinese companies
Russia’s most important customer in the Asian market.
Chinese banks turned into the main source of financing for Russian energy
behemoths, such as Rosneft and Transneft. Security co-operation encompassed not
only regular military exercises on land (the Peace Mission) but also joint naval drills. Trade in arms revived
and both sides expect to conclude new contracts on such weapons as the Su-35
fighters in the coming months. In Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing found ways
to divide their influences, with China dominating the energy realm and Russia the
security realm. Moreover, both sides seem able to reconcile their respective
initiatives directed towards the region – the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union and the Chinese ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’. Globally, China began to
replace Russia as the West’s key interlocutor and emerged as the major
coordinator of non-Western states in multilateral forums, such as the G-20 or
BRICS. Even the Russian-American ‘reset’ initiated in 2009 did not weaken ties
between Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, in the early-2010s Russian and Chinese policies
towards the US converged. Both states put pressure on the US (in Eastern Europe
and East Asia respectively) and opposed global American initiatives (e.g. blocking
intervention in the Syrian civil war).
The 2014 Ukrainian
crisis had the potential to scupper this booming Russia-China co-operation. Having
inspired a referendum in Crimea and annexed the peninsula, Moscow put Beijing
in a highly uncomfortable position. Russia infringed upon the principles of
non-interference and territorial integrity, cherished by China for reasons related
to its own fears of separatism, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang. Despite
these serious doubts, Beijing decided to support Moscow. China explained its
neutral position with regard to the annexation of Crimea with reference to
specific historic circumstances and stopped short of criticising Russia for its
‘silent intervention’ in Eastern Ukraine. During subsequent bilateral and
multilateral summits, Chinese leaders offered Vladimir Putin political and
economic support rather than criticism.
The Ukrainian
crisis did not open a new chapter in Russian-Chinese relations; it validated
changes which had been underway since the global economic crisis: Russia’s
increasing acceptance of China’s superior position and Beijing’s policy of
self-restraint towards Moscow. For a more nuanced account of the developments
leading to this outcome, see my forthcoming book.