China plays the Russian (military) card

Since the mid-2000s, Russo-Chinese military cooperation has been symbolized by the regularly-held large exercises, codenamed the Peace Mission. Presented as ‘anti-terrorist’ activities, their scenarios and the forces employed (regular army units supported by tactical and strategic aircraft) have been a clear indication of the aim to practice conventional warfare. Although the Peace Mission exercises have continued, the second decade of the 21^st century has been marked by the naval drills (Joint Sea 2012, 2013), which have become yet another hallmark of the change in Russo-Chinese relations.

In the 2000s the joint military exercises served to strengthen Russia’s image of a re-emerging great power and to demonstrate to the West its close partnership with China. In the face of growing tensions with the West, Moscow was eager to play the Chinese ‘military card’, suggesting the possibility of forging an alliance. Beijing, at that time, was focused on presenting itself as an almost exemplary peacefully-rising power.

For the last two years the roles have reversed. Now it is China who is playing the Russian military card, both against the U.S. and its East Asian allies. Asserting its claims in the contested waters of the East and South China Seas in a more robust way, China has turned to Russia for political support. The 2012 Sino-Russian naval drills, which took place in the Yellow Sea, were interpreted as a response to the exercises conducted by the US with the Philippines and South Korea. The Joint Sea 2013 mirrored the US-Japanese drill.

One should not over-estimate the importance of the Russo-Chinese naval cooperation. Both navies are hardly ready to fight against the U.S. or its allies. The main goal of the joint exercises is political. It has been intended to send a message to Washington and its partners in the region. Russia – at least formally – maintains a neutral stance with regard to the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. The engagement in military co-operation in the potential conflict area demonstrates, however, Moscow’s clear political support for Beijing’s position.

For the last couple of years Russia has been eager to show off, deploying its vessels in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Gulf of Aden. The naval drills with China become yet another opportunity to strengthen Russia’s image as a global naval power and an important actor in East Asian security. At the same time implicit support for China’s assertive policies undermines Moscow’s ability to act as a potential counter-balance against Beijing’s ambitions (which has recently been suggested by Elizabeth Wishnick) and limits Russia’s attractiveness to smaller East Asian states.

Sechin steps in Khodorkovsky’s shoes or 'ironiya sudby'

The past several  weeks have been marked with the acceleration of the once denounced Russo-Chinese energy co-operation.

On 24 June, the Russian state-owned energy giant, Rosneft and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) concluded a deal that provides for another breakthrough in energy trade between the two states.

Rosneft agreed to supply the CNPC with 30 million tons of oil per year. What this means in practice is the doubling – by 2018 – of the amount of oil that is currently sent to China via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline. This oil pipeline is by no means the only way of transporting Russian ‘black gold’ to Chinese customers. Starting in 2014, Rosneft will send an additional 7 million tons via another route – the Kazakhstan-China pipeline. Moreover, in 2012 the Russian energy behemoth agreed to supply the planned (though still not constructed) Russian-Chinese refinery in Tianjin with another 9 million tons of oil. Taken together, by the end of the decade Rosneft can be expected to send 46 million tons to China – almost 20% of Russian oil export (about 240 million tons).

On 21 June, the aforementioned CNPC entered into another ground-breaking agreement. It secured a 20% stake in the Yamal-LNG project. The project, led by the independent Russian gas producer Novatek, will enable Russia’s entry into the increasingly competitive LNG market.

The Russo-Chinese energy deals go far beyond their market value and are bound to have far-reaching consequences in the strategic and domestic realms of the two states.

Moscow continues to adapt to China’s rise, strengthening its ties with Beijing whilst allowing possible options for hedging in the case of a political setback between the two powers to disappear one after another. The actions undertaken by Rosneft, and its curator in Putin’s inner circle, Igor Sechin, have effectively undermined the Kremlin’s strategy of diversification of oil exports to Asia. They have led to the dependence on one customer – China. One cannot avoid a sense of the irony of fate – Igor Sechin as the chairman of Rosneft is pursuing a policy for which Mikhail Khodorkovsky has so far spent 10 years in jail. Back in 2002, Khodorkovsky proposed to build an oil pipeline exclusively to China. His idea went contrary to the then Russian strategy aimed at hedging against China: The Kremlin had planned to incite Sino-Japanese rivalry over access to Russian resources and oil transportation routes. The economic crisis of 2008-2009 forced Russia to give up this idea; although it still strived not to become reliant on one sole client in Asia. Sechin’s current behaviour almost completely undermines this.

With regard to the domestic scene, China has unintentionally become a shaping force of Russia’s domestic power relations. Sechin and Rosneft both thrive on deals with China, gaining easy money and additional influence through bargaining over further assets (such as TNK-BP which has just been taken over, while other oil firms like Bashneft are threatened with takeover). The CNPC’s deal with Novatek strengthens the latter against Gazprom and weakens this Russian gas behemoth in its continuous fight to keep its export monopoly. In the meantime, Gazprom has still not struck the expected deal with China, which was supposed to pave the way for the first gas pipeline in Asia and open the Chinese market. In June yet another publicly set deadline passed.

Trading places?

Throughout the 2000s an informal ‘division of labour’ emerged between Russia and China with regard to the global order. Russia has actively and loudly participated in the management of global affairs, becoming the member of all global forums – G-8, G-20 and BRICS – and making its voice heard. China, for its part, has been keeping a low profile, engaging in global issues only if vital Chinese interests were at stake. In the realm of high politics – international security, it has been Russia which has stood out as a non-Western voice, while China has relegated itself to the low politics – global economic governance (see the report by Charles Grant). This ‘division of labour’ has run contrary to the trends in the Russo-Chinese bilateral relationship, allowing the gradually weakening partner – Russia – to enjoy prestige and visibility. The arrangements resemble the pattern of the Cold War relationship between France and West Germany, with the former being compensated for economic weakness with political prestige.

The division of roles between Russia and China has been particularly striking with regard to international crises. For Moscow, the participation in every collective effort to solve an international crisis has been of crucial importance. As the only actor beyond the U.S., Russia has been a member of the Kosovo troika (in 2006-2008), the Six-Party-Talks in the North Korean crisis, the P-5+1 talks with Iran on nuclear issues, and the Middle Eastern Quartet. Russia’s tangible contribution to the solution or easing of the crisis has tended to be limited, but being at the table has seemed sufficient for the Kremlin. China has remained disengaged, with the exception of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Due to the latter’s proximity to the Chinese border, and security interests being at stake, Beijing has remained the most important power-broker in this case. From Moscow’s point of view none of the crises has touched upon vital interests; all have merely been a way to increase its great power prestige. The rule for China has been either to follow Russia’s stance or to remain disengaged - at least till May 2013.

The last take on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict undertaken by China has challenged the well-established pattern of crisis behaviour. Beijing proposed a four-point peace plan and played host to the Israeli Prime Minister, followed by the President of the Palestinian Authority. China’s initiative has little chance of achieving a breakthrough in the peace process, given that it repeats widely-acknowledged principles of the peace (of the peace what?) between Israel and Palestine. It nonetheless signals its willingness to gain a higher profile and a seat at the table. This move corresponds with China’s declaration to send about 500 troops as part of the Mali peace-keeping mission to which Russia has not contributed.

What are the consequences for the Russo-Chinese relationship of ‘trading places’? The recognition of Russia’s special role, demonstrated by Beijing – though in a symbolic rather than a substantial way – has facilitated Russia’s accommodation of China’s rise. In relations with Beijing, the Kremlin has enjoyed a certain comfort which has always been lacking with the U.S. Although both Russia and China have come to realize the bilateral power transition, they have still pretended that nothing has happened. With China’s more frequent participation in crisis-management, Russia’s global role is going to gradually lose its importance (see the commentary in the National Interest pointing to the need to replace the useless Middle Eastern Quartet with Russia onboard, with the Chinese-European mediation).

Factors to shape the future of Russia-China relations

There is an undeniable continuity in post-Cold War Russian-Chinese relations. They seem to be always progressing in a linear direction – towards greater engagement with one another. Even given the periods of stagnation – such as witnessed after Russia’s rapprochement with the US, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks – have not altered this dynamic.

This continuity is often ascribed to just one factor, which is most often either the persistence of unipolarity and the American global domination or similarity in authoritarian political-economic systems (this line has been developed in the most recent piece by Lilia Shevtsova). It is, however, worth going beyond the mono-causal picture by taking a closer look at those domestic, regional and global factors which may be expected to influence the relationship between Moscow and Beijing and make it more complex in the coming years.

Relative domestic stability in both Russia and China has contributed significantly to the development of their ties. Currently neither the old leader in the Kremlin, nor the new leadership in Zhongnanhai can look calmly into the future. While Putin sees his fading legitimacy and may expect further waves of protests, Xi Jinping and his team face conflicting calls, to liberalize the system and to bolster its international standing. Indeed, to which of these vows Xi Jinping responds in realising  the Chinese dream, does matter for the Kremlin.  

The regional dimension is no less interesting to observe, especially given the significance and scale of changes it is expected to undergo. The transformation of Eurasia is looming. It will be marked by the West’s withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as the Russian project of the Eurasian Union. A number of analysts interpret the Russian integration effort as an attempt to forestall further Chinese expansion into the ‘Russian’ Central Asia. The lack of a common political opponent after 2014 is going to adversely affect efforts to avoid open Russian-Chinese rivalry in the region. Moreover, if Moscow succeeds in making its pivot to Asia more substantial (it has so far remained in the sphere of rhetoric), diplomatic mastery in managing bilateral relations will be valuable.

In the global realm, China and Russia face a strategic environment which is far from clear-cut. The US retrenchment strategy has been coupled with more sophisticated attempts to boost American presence in East Asia and to hedge - de facto - against (if not contain) China’s rise. Interestingly, in response Russia and China alike have resorted to using increased assertiveness. Moscow brought the ‘reset’ with the US to a halt and Beijing has pursued territorial claims with regard to disputed maritime borders, thereby testing Washington’s resolve to support US allies in the region.

Groundbreaking events in recent international relations have, for the time being, fueled the Russo-Chinese relationship. The wave of the Arab Revolutions has strengthened the perception of increased potential for domestic turmoil and pushed Russia and China towards closer cooperation (in a similar vein to the wave of colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space in the mid-2000s). 

The (skeptic) narratives of Russia-China relations

Scepticism dominates when it comes to Russia-China relations. The more both states reassure each other and the rest of the world of their deepening ties and improving relations (which have been presented as ‘the best in all history’), the more eagerly analysts and commentators point to the deficiencies of the ‘strategic partnership’ between Moscow and Beijing. Three kinds of arguments stand out in the ‘sceptic’ narrative.

1) ‘The axis of convenience’. The phrase from the title of the so far most comprehensive account of Russia-China relations by Bobo Lo has been widely accepted in the academic world and beyond. The cooperation between the two powers is real, but shallow. Both cynically use each other to bolster their respective international standing, in particular towards the West and the U.S. but this relationship would not survive if put to a serious test. If it ever comes to choosing, each of the states would place its bets on Washington.

2) The inevitable clash. This reasoning accepts that although currently Russia and China remain close partners, this has to change in the not-so-distant future. The interests of two great powers interfere in too many areas to allow for a flourishing relationship. The Kremlin cannot remain indifferent in the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China. Beijing, which extends its sphere of influence beyond the Chinese borders, will sooner or later threaten Russia’s self-acclaimed privileged interests, most likely in the post-Soviet space.

3) The hidden rivalry. The point here is that Russia and China fiercely compete behind the façade of cordial relations. In Central Asia the competition takes place for energy resources and influence; in the Arctic it is over the Northern Sea Route; and globally it revolves around attracting Washington’s attention (the contest between the Sino-American G-2 and the US-Russia ‘reset’). China and Russia are said to contest each other for the arms markets of the developing states. Russia’s political support and arms sales to Vietnam are presented as a challenge to the Chinese position in East Asia. The Wall Street Journal commentary following Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow is a direct reflection of this kind of thinking.

In this blog I will be challenging these arguments, trying at the same time to remain sceptical with regard to the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing.

My take on Russia-China relations

The most outstanding and defining feature of the current Russo-Chinese relationship is, without doubt, the growing imbalance between the two great powers. For the first time in several centuries China has gained the upper hand. Despite this reversal of traditional roles, the Kremlin does not seem to perceive China’s rise in terms of a threat. Regardless of the opinions voiced by Western and Russian commentators alike, indicating that Moscow will end being subordinated to Beijing’s vision of the relationship, Putin and his team have not resorted to the hedging strategy, nor has he tried to counterbalance his larger neighbour. On the contrary, we have observed the strengthening of Moscow-Beijing ties since the late-2000s, which the global economic crisis has only served to accelerate. Two important spheres of cooperation – arms trade and energy – have passed from stagnation to flourishing over the past few months.

One of the primary movers behind this rapprochement is the domestic context of Russian politics. The rise of China has not threatened Putin’s regime; rather it has strengthened the key players of the Kremlin’s ‘winning coalition’. I have developed this argument in more detail here.

China's race to the superpower status is by no means neglected in Moscow, and Russia has been watching it closely. There is, however, no single dominating opinion. ‘The bear watches the dragon’ presents this debate in more detail.