The past
week saw a Chinese destroyer accompanied by a missile frigate and a supply ship
all set off for the Hawaii archipelago. Although it may be tempting to make
allusions to the Japanese navy approaching Pearl Harbour during the Second
World War, this was part of a multi-national naval drill, the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
China has for some time now been regarded as key to the future of the international
order. It is thus not surprising that every Chinese move, especially involving
its military, is closely watched. The Sino-Vietnamese brinkmanship over the
maritime borders in the South China Sea several weeks ago appeared to confirm
China’s image of an increasingly assertive great power, attempting to push
through its ideas for the East Asian neighbourhood. However, recent steps taken
by Beijing did not fit this pattern. In addition to participation in US-organised
multilateral naval exercises, China deployed 850 troops to boost the UN
peace-keeping mission in South Sudan. These are, of course, very different
types of political-military engagement but the similarity in their
interpretation is remarkable. They are treated by observers and commentators as
strong political signals from Beijing.
RIMPAC is
indeed a significant event as it is the world's largest international maritime
warfare exercise hosted and administered by the United States. It makes claims that
it is crucial for sustaining cooperative relationships critical to ensuring the
safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans. This was the first time
that China decided to take part in RIMPAC. This move is interpreted as signalling Beijing’s benign intentions,
especially given recent Sino-American tensions. It also suggests China’s
growing readiness to become engaged internationally and reinforces the image of
China as a responsible global actor. Peacekeeping
in Africa is seen through similar lens, in terms of improving China’s
credentials as a stakeholder in the international order. Beijing makes use of this
to demonstrate its benign face to the outside world. Moreover, South Sudan is
not the only instance of Chinese military engagement in UN peacekeeping
operations. In 2013, the UN mission in Mali was aided by 500 Chinese troops.
The question is whether China’s participation in multilateral efforts to
manage international security goes beyond the symbolic, whether China can make
a tangible and meaningful contribution to peace and cooperation in the Pacific
or to the solution of the Sudanese crisis. China has certainly been forced to
leave its ‘splendid isolation’ from global high politics and to start sharing the
problems of arranging the international order. It has to take care of its
interests far away from the centre. The ubiquitous presence of Chinese workers
worldwide makes it necessary for China to be prepared for contingencies. This
was a lesson China took in the case of the 2011 revolution in Libya, when it
had to evacuate its 30,000 citizens. The growing appetite for energy
resources, oil in particular, is another thread which may explain China’s
readiness to make more vigorous foreign forays. Beijing’s involvement in South Sudan was
frequently interpreted as directly related to China’s overarching goal of
securing greater access to natural resources. Regardless of its incentives,
China’s engagement reinforces the Western ideas of how the international order
should be arranged. Its acceptance of troops being sent to South Sudan followed
on from a change to The United Nations
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate, which now covers the
protection of civilians and human rights monitoring as well as support for the
delivery of humanitarian aid.
Against the backdrop of
China’s embrace of multilateral co-operation, Russia has neither taken part in
RIMPAC 2014 nor contributed to the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan; or, for
that matter, last year, in Mali. Does this abstention testify to Russia’s diminishing
interest in global issues and the ‘change of places’, with China gradually
taking on more responsibilities globally? The reversal of Moscow and Beijing’s
roles has been more and more visible in the aftermath of the global economic crisis.
Russia’s economic interests around the globe are negligible when compared to
China’s. Russia does not export its workforce, nor does it import resources. Moreover,
Western expectations towards both states vary. When Russia took part in the
2012 edition of RIMPAC, this was interpreted as hedging against China, not as a
potential contribution to the safety and stability of global sea lanes...
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.